




Environmental appraisal presents deeper and wider problems than are typically conceded in 
policy. Strong political pressures for decision justification routinely force the closing down of 
due deliberation over the real limits to knowledge. Even technical language can become 
warped – to imply that all environmental dilemmas are susceptible to apparently precise and 
definitive probabilistic risk analysis. The inconvenient messiness of less tractable aspects of 
incertitude (strict uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance) can thereby be suppressed. 
Reviewing the most serious problems, this chapter outlines practical methods for resisting 
these pressures and opening up a more rigorous, robust, transparent – and democratically 




Threats to climate, biodiversity, soils, air and water join longstanding issues of poverty and 
vulnerability in demanding urgent action. Radical transformations are required in global 
institutions and infrastructures for provision of energy, food, water, mobility and livelihoods. 
So, political, economic and social – as well as environmental – stakes are high. Yet, it is 
rarely the case that all details of the issues in question can be definitively pinned down (Gee 
et al. 2013). There usually remains significant scope for questions over: appropriate 
knowledges; causal processes; possible implications; and relevant actions. These are the 
dilemmas of what is often ambiguously called ‘uncertainty’ – but more accurately described 
as ‘incertitude’ (Harremoës et al. 2001). As we will see, specialist usages of ‘uncertainty’ can 
elide crucially different features of context – allowing irresponsible “pretence of knowledge” 
(Hayek 1978). An overarching term like ‘incertitude’ helps avoid this.  
 
Whatever it is called, what makes incertitude more tricky are the political realities in which 
it is set. Despite the value of high quality evidence and analysis, even the best available 
policy-relevant science is prone to delivering divergent pictures of salient problems and 
solutions – for instance in energy (Sundqvist et al. 2004), chemicals (Saltelli et al. 2008), 
biotechnology (Stirling & Mayer 2001) and industrial safety (Amendola 2001). Indeed, the 
levels of incertitude associated with a relevant peer-reviewed literature are (when attended 
to) often sufficient to support many contrasting possible courses of action (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1990). The most important feature of ‘sound science’ or ‘evidence based policy’, 
then, is that these disciplines are rarely adequate, definitely to justify any single particular 
intervention. In other words, dilemmas of incertitude typically mean that no particular policy 
can be uniquely validated by the available evidence. The idea of a single ‘evidence based 
policy’ is an oxymoron. 
Sadly, these challenges are seriously neglected – sometimes even denied – in mainstream 
environmental policy. This can be seen even in a field where ‘science based’ comparative 
appraisal methods are arguably at their most sophisticated and mature: in the energy sector. 
This is an area where climate change as well as many other environmental issues present 
some of their most formidable policy challenges. So, an impressive range of techniques 
address questions over which energy strategy looks on balance most favourable. Focusing 
on results expressed as monetary ‘environmental externalities’, Figure 1 (below) 
summarises a problem that is also common to environmental risk assessment, multicriteria 
appraisal or life cycle analysis (Stirling 2010). Shown on the right, is the number of peer-
reviewed studies for each energy option (all with results cited in official regulatory 
interventions). Particular findings of one indicative study are shown in grey. Results obtained 
in the entire literature are shown as black bars, the thickest parts of which give the range 
for the central half of all studies.  
 
Figure 1: Neglected variability in environmental appraisal – the example of energy assessments 
(graphic adapted from (Sundqvist et al. 2004)) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the incertitude expressed in an individual study of comparative 
environmental implications of different policies, tends to be very small compared to the 
corresponding range in the relevant peer-reviewed literature as a whole. So policy debates 
informed by just a subset of studies, typically only get a partial impression of the issues at 
stake. It is therefore routinely possible to justify on grounds of selected studies, any one 
among many different policy choices. And what is true in the field of energy policy, also 
applies in other areas of environmental governance – like agriculture, transport, or water. In 
interactions between different sectors, dilemmas of incertitude are correspondingly 
amplified.  
Policy challenges are even further compounded, when it is taken into account how 
pressures for closure in the ‘real world’ of policy making conflict with actual levels of 
incertitude in the ‘real real world’ of natural environments and societies themselves. The 
open-endedness of policy choices illustrated in Figure 1 is an unavoidable reflection of 
complex environmental realities. Just as a simple object looks different from contrasting 
angles, so pictures of complex environmental challenges and solutions differ even more 
radically, depending how they are ‘framed’.  
Figure 2 summarises a range of dimensions under which analysis can be framed differently – 
but equally rigorously and legitimately – such as to yield radically distinctive answers. These 
resulting diversities are seriously inconvenient in high stakes political processes, in which 
policy actors are incentivised to represent their favoured arguments in exaggeratedly 
precise and determinate ways. Acknowledgements of incertitude are typically held to 
weaken political justification. So strong pressures are experienced by analysts and academics 
to perform various artificial kinds of analytical closure (Stirling 2010). This is why challenges 
of incertitude remain neglected – and typically large ranges of variability like those shown in 
Figure 1 are frequently ignored. 
 
Figure 2: Examples of different kind of framing assumptions implicated in environmental 
incertitude  
 Contrasting responses to incertitude 
What can be done about these formidable challenges of incertitude in environmental 
governance? Although there are no panaceas, there exist many practical responses. Like 
incertitude itself, many of these also remain neglected. In limited space, only an indicative 
sample can be covered here. For a start, there is the language of environmental appraisal. 
Terms like ‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘ignorance’ are bandied around in many 
diverse ways in this field. It is not realistic or useful to try to assert only one kind of usage. 
But what is essential in interests of effective decisions, is to resist instrumental pressures to 
use such words in ways that systematically exaggerate the tractability of incertitude.  
Why this matters, is summarised in Figure 3. Long central to environmental appraisal (EPA 
1998)(UK_Department_of_Environment 1995)(Suter 2006), the word ‘risk’ has for more 
than a century referred to a condition under which there is confidence that problematic 
knowledge can satisfactorily be addressed by assigning probabilities to reflect perceived 
relative likelihoods for each of a defined range of possible outcomes (NRC 1983)(PCCRARM 
1997)(Byrd & Cothern 2000). Accordingly, the dimensions of Figure 3 represent confidence 
in the quality of knowledge experienced under each of these twin constituting parameters of 
risk: probability and outcomes (Stirling 2010).  In opening up these dimensions, a range of 
complementary methods become visible beyond risk assessment. 
  
Figure 3: Different aspects of incertitude, as distinguished in relation to two dimensions of 
knowledge  (adapted from (Stirling 2010)) 
 
For a century or so, economists have explicitly contrasted a strict definition of ‘uncertainty’ 
with the state of ‘risk’ – uncertainty in these terms being a condition under which there 
cannot be confidence in any single representation of probabilities (Knight 1921)(Keynes 
1922). As such, uncertainty is a situation in which (in the words of the celebrated probability 
theorist Finetti (Finetti 1974), probabilities simply “do not exist”. Yet this same term 
‘uncertainty’ is now routinely used in environmental studies, with exactly the opposite 
meaning – where political pressures discussed above nonetheless force assertion of singular 
representations of probabilities. Suppressing the open-endedness of colloquial ideas of 
uncertainty as well as clashing with the strict definition (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990), it is this 
that constitutes the “pretence of knowledge” referred to above (Hayek 1978). So, it is to 
avoid such misleading confusions, that the term ‘incertitude’ can be used in a more general 
fashion, clearly covering all senses of the colloquial general implications of ‘uncertainty’. But 
the point here is not about words, but whether academic or policy imaginations even 
acknowledge at all, a condition under which there is little confidence in any single picture of 
probabilities (Wynne 1992). 
However, Figure 3 also shows that this is not the only reason for thinking about ‘incertitude’ 
in this general way. Even if suppression of ‘uncertainty’ (in a strict sense) is avoided, other 
deep challenges remain. For instance, colloquial use of the word ‘ambiguity’ refers to a 
parallel dilemma, in which it is not the likelihood of different outcomes that is at issue, but 
even more fundamental problems around defining, measuring, partitioning or bounding the 
possibilities themselves (Stirling 2010). This can occur even for historical events that have 
already occurred (which are in this sense ‘certain’), but where questions still arise over 
‘what happened?’ In other words, ambiguity is about ‘contradictory certainties’ (Thompson 
& Warburton 1985) 
 
Ambiguity involves many conflicts, in: interests or values; notions of ‘benefit’ or ‘harm’; ideas 
about policy options. Here, it is well established in rational choice theory (the Nobel prize-
winning paradigm underlying risk assessment), that there can be no guarantee in a plural 
society, of any single ordering of social preferences (Arrow 1963). In other words – even 
aside from difficulties with probabilities – the idea of calculating a uniquely optimal 
environmental response in ‘the real world’ – is not only difficult in practice… it is 
fundamentally impossible in principle. Under ambiguity, then, simplistically singular ideas of 
‘sound science’ are also a seriously misleading oxymoron. 
 
A final implication of Figure 3, is that there also exist situations in which all these dilemmas 
of incertitude apply together (Dovers & Handmer 1995). This is referred to in the literature 
as a state of ‘ignorance’ (Faber & Proops 1990) – a condition under which “we don’t know 
what we don’t know” (Wynne 1992), where “unknown unknowns” yield the ever-present 
prospect of ‘surprise’ (Brooks 1986). Far from being abstract, the importance of ignorance is 
widespread in environmental studies. In challenges like BSE, ozone depletion and endocrine 
disrupting chemicals (Gee et al. 2013)(Harremoës et al. 2001), for instance, the key 
problems were not erroneous probability distributions, but that the possibilities themselves 
were surprises.  
 
It is in these ways, then, that Figure 3 highlights some key challenging-but-neglected aspects 
of ‘incertitude’. In focusing directly and practically on implications for methods, it spans a 
diversity of more elaborate taxonomies of different sources and contexts for incertitude 
(Faber & Proops 1990)(Smith & Stern 2011)(Walker et al. 2003). For each contrasting 
aspect, it indicates illustrative kinds of method, which can help draw out complex 
implications that are often suppressed in conventional environmental policy. By encouraging 
the avoidance of reduction of every challenge merely to risk assessment, the resulting 
general approach is more precautionary (Harremoës et al. 2001). But the point here is not 
to suggest that each specific instance of environmental problem can be assigned to a 
particular category. Instead, the framework is heuristic – aiding thinking about a wider 
diversity of methods beyond reductive forms of risk assessment or optimisation.  
 
Taken together, the methods shown in Figure 3 offer ways to be more realistic about the 
inconvenient fact that contrasting framings (Figure 2), often lead to enormous discrepancies 
in environmental appraisal (Figure 1). To ignore this in governance can leave the most 
vulnerable people exposed to the consequences – a syndrome the social theorist Beck 
called “organised irresponsibility” (Beck 1992). By making greater use of these practical 
‘Cinderella methods’ for addressing different aspects of incertitude, environmental appraisal 
can become more robust about specific conditions under which contrasting conclusions 
arise over the best policy actions. Methods can help reshape institutions. So environmental 
policy can hope at the same time to become more rigorous and more accountable. Instead 
of forcing technocratic closure of a kind that can reinforce entrenched interests, this can 
help open crucial space for what has so often proven essential in achieving the necessary 
environmental transformations: democratic struggle (Scoones et al. 2015). 
 
Learning Resources 
A classic early articulation of challenges of incertitude can be found in reference (Funtowicz 
& Ravetz 1990). A wealth of case studies and practical lessons are deeply analysed in 
references (Gee et al. 2013) and (Harremoës et al. 2001). 
A website that builds on rich accumulated experience in exactly the tradition of analysis of 
incertitude introduced in reference (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990), to point to a variety of 
practical tools for analysing different aspects of incertitude can be found here: 
http://www.nusap.net/ 
Another website that discusses broader methods likes those shown in Figure 3 for generally 
‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’ policy appraisal – with links to many other web resources 
– can be found at the STEPS Centre: http://steps-centre.org/methods/ 
A particular web-based interactive tool that practically illustrates what is meant by ‘opening 
up’ incertitude as discussed here, can be found at: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/mcm/index 
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